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EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION VIA OPTIMAL TRANSPORT
SHUI-NEE CHOW, WUCHEN LI, JUN LU AND HAOMIN ZHOU
Abstract. We propose a new dynamics for equilibrium selection of finite player dis-
crete strategy games. The dynamics is motivated by optimal transportation, and models
individual players’ myopicity, greedy and uncertainty when making decisions. The sta-
tionary measure of the dynamics provides each pure Nash equilibrium a probability by
which it is ranked. For potential games, its dynamical properties are characterized by
entropy and Fisher information.
1. Introduction
Game theory plays a vital role in economics, biology, social network, etc. [12, 22, 23,
24, 25]. It models conflict and cooperation between rational decision makers. Each player
in a game minimizes his or her own cost function. Nash equilibrium (NE) describes a
status that no player is willing to change his or her strategy unilaterally. A fundamental
question in game theory is that if there are multiple pure Nash equilibria, how can one
select or rank them? This problem has been studied previously using various approaches.
One classical approach [13, 14] selects NEs by refining the concept of equilibrium such as
payoff dominance and risk dominance principle. Another class of approaches uses learning
dynamics by assuming that the players have bounded knowledge and they need to “learn”
from what occurred in previous stages of the game and then respond to other players’
strategies [29, 30]. In these settings irrationalities of individual players are often consid-
ered. Such examples include fictitious play, no-regret dynamics, and logit dynamics. To
demonstrate the idea, we describe logit dynamics in detail [2]. In logit dynamics, players
are assumed to play a game repeatedly. At each time step, one player is selected uniformly
at random and its strategy is updated according to a Gibbs-like measure parametrized by
a positive number representing the rationality level. This process gives rise to a Markov
jump process, whose distribution converges to a stationary distribution. By vanishing the
rationality parameter, the stationary distributions converges to a unique measure, provid-
ing crucial information of the stabilities of the NEs and hence giving rise a mechanism for
equilibrium selections [10].
On the other hand, for continuous strategy games, equilibrium selection can be done
in a rather natural way by stochastic differential equations (SDEs) and optimal transport
theory. Individual players can be modeled to make decisions according to a stochastic pro-
cess, named best-reply process [8]. There players change their pure strategies locally and
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simultaneously in a continuous fashion according to the direction that minimizes their own
cost function most rapidly. Players’ irrationalities are introduced by Brownian motions
with a parameter representing irrationality levels. The time evolution of the probability
density of the best-reply process is characterized by a Fokker-Planck equation, which is
the learning dynamics of the game. For potential games in which all players have the
same cost function named potential, this learning dynamics is the gradient flow of the free
energy in the probability space equipped with Wasserstein metric [1, 28]. Here the free
energy refers to the average of potential plus negative of Shannon-Boltzman entropy, rep-
resenting the amount of irrationalities or risks taken by the players. This understanding
connects the learning dynamics with statistical physics [26]. Following this connection,
if players are purely rational (vanishing the parameter), NEs are stationary points of the
players’ best-reply process. Thus the invariant measure associated with best-reply dynam-
ics naturally introduces an order of NEs. This ranking method shares many similarities
with the one described in [7], which relates to Conley-Markov matrix.
Motivated by learning dynamics and continuous best-reply processes, we propose a new
learning dynamics for discrete strategy games. A key step is to introduce Markov jump
processes in discrete space, inspired by the discrete optimal transport theory recently
developed in [4, 5]. Let S = S1×· · ·×SN be the strategy set where Si is the finite discrete
strategy set of player i and let ui(x) be the cost function of player i. The best-reply
process Xβ(t) is defined with state space S and the transition probability
Pr(Xβ(t+ h) = y | Xβ(t) = x)
=

∑N
i=1(u¯i(y)− u¯i(x))+h+ o(h) if y ∈ ∪Ni=1Ni(x) ;
1−∑Ni=1∑y∈Ni(x)(u¯i(y)− u¯i(x))+h+ o(h) if y = x ;
0 otherwise ,
(1)
where Ni(x) is the neighborhood of strategy x for player i and y ∈ Ni(x) if y and x differ
only at Si. ρ(t, x) is the probability density function of Xβ(t) and u¯i(x) is defined as
u¯i(x) = ui(x) + β log ρ(t, x) .
Term ρ(t, x) can be described from the perspective of individual players as follows. From
the beginning of the repeated play of the game, each player simulate Xβ(·) infinitely many
times until time t and ρ(t, x) is the distributions of Xβ(·) at t. This interpretation is
different from that of fictitious play in that players in fictitious play rely on only one
realization of the Markov process while our model depends on infinite many simulations.
Process Xβ(t) describes players’ behaviors with three features. Firstly, Xβ(t) reflects
players’ myopicity when making decisions. In other words, players make their decisions
based solely on the most recent information and within the neighborhood in the strategy
set. Secondly, players select next strategy that decrease their collective cost with highest
probability. This is to say players are greedy during the decision-making process. Thirdly,
term log ρ(t, x) introduces randomness in discrete settings. This randomness models play-
ers’ irrationality due to either making mistakes or taking risks. The latter interpretation
allows us to regard u¯i(x) as noisy cost. Intuitively, if a strategy profile has large cost but
low probability, its noisy cost will be low and hence encourage players to select the profile.
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The density function ρ(t, x) enjoys many appealing mathematical properties. For po-
tential games, it can be regarded as a gradient flow that converges to the minimizer of the
free energy. It can be shown that the convergence is exponentially fast and the convergence
rate can be accurately characterized by relative Fisher information [28], a key concept in
statistical physics [11]. In addition, the dissipation of the free energy along this learning
dynamics exactly equals the relative Fisher information.
The paper is organized in the following order. In section 2, we give a brief introduction
to best-reply dynamics and optimal transport theory in continuous spaces; In section 3,
we describe the mathematical properties of best-reply dynamics via optimal transport
defined on discrete strategy games. The connection of our model and statistical physics is
discussed in section 4. In section 5, we illustrate equilibrium selections via the proposed
dynamics for some well-known games.
2. Equilibrium selection in continuous strategy game
In this section, we briefly review best-reply dynamics and its connection with optimal
transportation theory.
Consider a game consisting N players i ∈ {1, · · · , N}. Each player i chooses a strategy
xi from a Borel strategy set Si, e.g. Si = Rni . Denote S = S1 × · · · × SN . Let x be the
vector of all players’ decision variables:
x = (x1, · · · , xN ) = (xi, x−i) ∈ S , for any i = 1, · · · , N ,
where we use the notation
x−i = {x1, · · · , xi−1, xi+1, · · · , xN} .
Each player i has cost function ui : S → R, where ui(x) is a globally Lipchitz continuous
function with respect to x. The objective of each player i is to minimize the cost function
min
xi∈Rni
ui(xi) = ui(xi, x−i) .
A strategy profile x∗ = (x∗1, · · · , x∗N ) is a Nash equilibrium (NE) if no player is willing to
change his or her current strategy unilaterally
ui(x
∗
i , x
∗
−i) ≤ ui(xi, x∗−i) for any xi ∈ Si , i = 1, · · · , N .
It is natural to consider stochastic processes to describe players’ decisions-making pro-
cesses in a game. For each player i, instead of finding x∗i satisfying NE directly, he or she
plays the game according to a stochastic process Xi(t), t ∈ [0,+∞). Here t is an artificial
time variable, at which player i selects his or her decision based on the current strategies
of all other players Xj(t), t ∈ {1, · · · , N}. It is important to note that all players make
their decisions simultaneously and without knowing others’ decisions. Each player selects
a strategy that decreases his or her own cost most rapidly. To model the uncertainties of
decision making, an N -dimensional independent Brownian motion is added
dXi = −∇Xiui(Xi, X−i)dt+
√
2βdBit , (2)
where β > 0 controls the magnitude of the noise. SDE (2) X(t) = (Xi(t))
N
i=1 is called the
best-reply process. Observe that if a Nash equilibrium exists, it is also the equilibrium of
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(2) with β = 0. It is known that the transition density function ρ(t, x) of the stochastic
process X(t) satisfies the Fokker-Planck equation (FPE)
∂ρ(t, x)
∂t
= ∇ · (ρ(t, x)(∇xiui(xi, x−i))Ni=1) + β∆ρ(t, x) .
In the case that the game is a potential game, i.e. there exists a C1 potential function
φ : RN → R, such that ∇xiui(xi, x−i) = ∇xiφ(x). The best-reply process (2) becomes
dX = −∇φ(X)dt+
√
2βdBt ,
which is a perturbed gradient flow, whose density function satisfies
∂ρ(t, x)
∂t
= ∇ · (ρ(t, x)∇φ(x)) + β∆ρ(t, x) . (3)
The stationary distribution of (3) is the Gibbs measure given by
ρ∗(x) =
1
K
e
−φ(x)
β , where K =
∫
Rn
e
−φ(x)
β dx .
It’s easily seen that the Gibbs measure introduces an order of Nash equilibria in terms of
the potential φ(x). In other words, given two Nash equilibria, the one with larger density
value will be considered more stable. One can extend this ranking to general games by
studying the invariant measure of (2), see [7].
Equation (3) is closely related to optimal transport theory and has a gradient flow
interpretation in geometry. This interpretation enables us to derive the new model for
discrete strategy games. In short, the optimal transport theory introduces a distance,
known as the Wasserstein metric, on the probability density space. Equipped with this
metric, the density space forms an infinite dimensional Riemannian manifold. On this
manifold, FPE (3) is a gradient flow of an informational functional, known as free energy:∫
Rd
φ(x)ρ(x)dx+ β
∫
Rd
ρ(x) log ρ(x)dx . (4)
In addition, equation (3) can be rewritten as
∂ρ(t, x)
∂t
= ∇ · (ρ(t, x)(∇φ(x) + β∇ log ρ(t, x))) .
The term ∇(φ + log ρ) is called the Wasserstein gradient in [1]. The corresponding SDE
can be understood as
dX = −∇(φ(X) + β log ρ(t,X))dt . (5)
Notice that process X and its density function are coupled. The term log ρ corresponds to
the Brownian motion in the best-reply SDE. The formulation of (5) gives the justification
of our definition of noise payoff and motivates the definition of the jump process in discrete
strategy games.
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3. Equilibrium selection in Discrete Strategy set
In this section, we study the time evolution of the probability density function of best-
reply process (1) for discrete strategy games. We will show that this density function can
be viewed as a FPE in discrete settings under optimal transport metric. From this density
function, one can calculate the limit distribution of (1) for ranking NEs. In addition, we
will show that for potential games, the FPE is actually a gradient flow.
3.1. Optimal transport in norm form game. We first review some notations in game
theory [22]. Consider a game with N players. Each player i ∈ {1, · · · , N} chooses a
strategy xi in a discrete strategy set
Si = {1, · · · ,Mi}
where Mi is an integer. Denote the joint strategy set
S = S1 × · · · × SN .
Similar to continuous games, each player i has a cost function ui : S → R,
ui(x) = ui(xi, x−i) .
If there are only two players (N = 2), it is customary to write the cost function in a
bi-matrix form (A,BT ) with A = (u1(i, j))M1×M2 , BT = (u2(i, j))M1×M2 where (i, j) ∈
S1 × S2. This form of representation is called normal form.
Example 1. Two members of a criminal gang are arrested and imprisoned. Each prisoner
is given the opportunity either to defect the other by testifying that the other committed
the crime, or to cooperate with the other by remaining silent. Their cost matrix is given
by
player 2 C player 2 D
player 1 C (1, 1) (3, 0)
player 1 D (0, 3) (2, 2)
In this case, the strategy set is S = {C,D}, where C represents “Cooperate” and D repre-
sents “Defect”. The cost function can be represented as (A,BT ), where
A =
(
1 3
0 2
)
, BT =
(
1 0
3 2
)
.
In this example, it is easy to verify that (D,D) is the NE of game.
For a given finite-player game, we construct a corresponding strategy graph as follows.
For each strategy set Si, construct a graph Gi = (Si, Ei). Two strategies x and y are
connected if player i can switch strategy from x to y. If the player is free to switch
between any two strategies, it makes Gi a complete graph. Let G = (S,E) = G12 · · ·2GN
be the Cartesian product of all the strategy graphs. In other words, S = S1 × · · · × SN
and x = (x1, · · · , xN ) ∈ S and y = (y1, · · · , yN ) ∈ S are connected if their components
are different at only one index and these different components are connected in their
component graph. For any x = (x1, · · · , xN ) ∈ S, denote its neighborhood to be N (x)
N (x) = {y ∈ S | edge(x, y) ∈ E} ,
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and directional neighborhood to be
Ni(x) = {(x1, · · · , xi−1, y, xi+1, · · · , xN ) | y ∈ Si, edge(xi, y) ∈ Ei} ,
for i = 1, · · · , N . The definition of Ni(x) entails that each player selects his or her strategy
with other players’ strategies fixed. Notice that
N (x) =
N⋃
i=1
Ni(x) .
Example 2. Consider a two player Prisoner-Dilemma game, where S1 = S2 = {C,D}.
The strategy graph is the following.
C,C C,D
D,C D,D
We now introduce an optimal transport distance on the probability space of the strategy
graph. The probability space (i.e. a simplex) on all strategies is given by:
P(S) = {(ρ(x))x∈S ∈ R|S| |
∑
x∈S
ρ(x) = 1 , ρ(x) ≥ 0 , for any x ∈ S} ,
where ρ(x) is the probability at each vertex x, and |S| is total number of strategies. Denote
the interior of P(S) by Po(S).
Given any function Φ: S → R on strategy set S, define ∇Φ: S × S → R as
∇Φ(x, y) =
{
Φ(x)− Φ(y) if (x, y) ∈ E ;
0 otherwise .
Let m : S×S → R be an anti-symmetric flux function such that m(x, y) = −m(y, x). The
divergence of m, denoted as div(m) ∈ R|S|, is defined by
div(m)(x) = −
∑
y∈N (x)
m(x, y) .
For the purpose of defining our distance function, we will use a particular flux function
m(x, y) = ρ∇Φ := g(x, y, ρ)∇Φ(x, y) ,
where g(x, y, ρ) represents the discrete probability (weight) on edge(x, y) and satisfies
g(x, y, ρ) = g(y, x, ρ) , min{ρ(x), ρ(y)} ≤ g(x, y, ρ) ≤ max{ρ(x), ρ(y)} . (6)
A particular choice of g(x, y, ρ) is of up-wind scheme type, whose explicit formulation will
be given shortly.
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We can now define the discrete inner product on Po(S):
(∇Φ,∇Φ)ρ := 1
2
∑
(x,y)∈E
(Φ(x)− Φ(y))2g(x, y, ρ) ,
which induces the following distance on Po(S).
Definition 1. Given two discrete probability function ρ0, ρ1 ∈ Po(S), define the optimal
transport metric function W:
W(ρ0, ρ1)2 = inf{
∫ 1
0
(∇Φ,∇Φ)ρdt : dρ
dt
+ div(ρ∇Φ) = 0 , ρ(0) = ρ0, ρ(1) = ρ1} .
(Po(S),W) is a well defined finite dimensional Riemannian manifold [4, 18], which
enables us to define the gradient flow (FPE) in Po(S).
3.2. FPEs for potential games. We first derive the FPE for discrete potential games.
Here a potential game means that, there exists a potential function φ : S → R, such that
φ(x)− φ(y) = ui(x)− ui(y) , for any x, y ∈ Si and i = 1, · · · , N .
As in the continuous case (4), our objective functional in P(S) is the discrete free energy∑
x∈S
φ(x)ρ(x) + β
∑
x∈S
ρ(x) log ρ(x) ,
where the first term is average of potential and the second one is the linear entropy
modeling risk-taking.
Using this objective functional, we construct the metricW with a upwind type g(x, y, ρ)
satisfying (6):
g(x, y, ρ) =

ρ(x) if φ(x) + β log ρ(x) > φ(y) + β log ρ(y);
ρ(y) if φ(x) + β log ρ(x) < φ(y) + β log ρ(y);
ρ(x)+ρ(y)
2 if φ(x) + β log ρ(x) = φ(y) + β log ρ(y).
Theorem 2 (Gradient flow). Given a potential game with strategy graph G = (S,E),
potential φ(x) and constant β ≥ 0.
(i) The gradient flow of∑
x∈S
φ(x)ρ(x) + β
∑
x∈S
ρ(x) log ρ(x) ,
on the metric space (Po(S),W) is the FPE
dρ(t, x)
dt
=
∑
y∈N (x)
ρ(t, y)[φ(y)− φ(x) + β(log ρ(t, y)− log ρ(t, x))]+
−
∑
y∈N (x)
ρ(t, x)[φ(x)− φ(y) + β(log ρ(t, x)− log ρ(t, y))]+ .
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(ii) For β > 0, Gibbs measure
ρ∗(x) =
1
K
e
−φ(x)
β , where K =
∑
x∈S
e
−φ(x)
β ,
is the unique stationary measure of ODE (2).
(iii) For any given initial condition ρ0 ∈ Po(S), there exists a unique solution ρ(t) :
[0,∞)→ Po(S) to equation (2).
The proof follows [4, 5], so omitted here.
3.3. FPE for discrete strategy games. For general games, as in the continuous case,
the FPE, the time evolution of probability function of Xβ(t) in (1), can’t be interpreted
as gradient flows for some functional. To establish FPEs discrete settings, we observe
that in (2), if the underlying graph corresponds to the Cartesian grid partition, (2) is
the numerical discretization of the continuous FPE using upwind scheme, see [6]. This
motivates us to define the following FPE.
Definition 3. For a general game with strategy graph G = (S,E) with cost functionals
ui(x) for i ∈ 1, · · · , N , define its FPE to be
dρ(t, x)
dt
=
N∑
i=1
∑
y∈Ni(x)
[ui(y)− ui(x) + β(log ρ(t, y)− log ρ(t, x))]+ρ(t, y)
−
N∑
i=1
∑
y∈Ni(x)
[ui(x)− ui(y) + β(log ρ(t, x)− log ρ(t, y))]+ρ(t, x) .
(7)
Notice that ∪Ni=1Ni(x) = N (x). So when the general game is a potential game, the above
FPE coincides with (2). Our main result for general games is the following theorem.
Theorem 4 (General flow). Given a N -player game with strategy graph G = (S,E), cost
functional ui, i = 1, · · · , N and a constant β ≥ 0.
(i) For all β > 0 and any initial condition ρ(0) ∈ Po(S), there exists a unique solution
ρ(t) : [0,∞)→ Po(S)
of (7).
(ii) Given any initial condition ρ0(t), denote ρ
β(t) the solutions of (7) with varying
β’s. Then for any fixed time T ∈ (0,+∞)
lim
β→0
ρβ(t) = ρ0(t) , t ∈ [0, T ] .
(iii) Assume there are k distinct pure Nash equilibria x1, · · · , xk ∈ S. Let ρ∗(x) be a
measure such that
Support of ρ∗(x) ⊂ {x1, · · · , xk} ,
then ρ∗(x) is the stationary solution of (7) with β = 0.
FINITE PLAYER GAME 9
Proof. (i) is a slight modification of results in [6]. (ii) Let’s denote ODE (7) for β > 0 as
a matrix form
dρβ(t)
dt
= Q(ρ, β)ρβ(t) .
We observe that if β = 0, Q(ρ, β) = Q is a constant matrix. By the similar reason in
proving Theorem 2, we know that for any initial condition ρ0, there exists a compact set
B(ρ0) ⊂ Po(S), such that ρβ(t) ∈ B(ρ0) for any β. Hence there exists a constant M > 0,
such that
‖(Q(ρ, β)−Q)ρβ(t)‖ ≤Mβ ,
where ‖ ·‖ is the 2-norm. In other words, the difference of the ODE (7)’s solution at β > 0
and β = 0 is
d(ρβ(t)− ρ0(t))
dt
=Q(ρβ, β)ρβ −Qρ0
=Q(ρβ − ρ0) + (Q(ρβ, β)−Q)ρβ .
Hence
d‖ρβ(t)− ρ0(t)‖
dt
≤‖Q(ρβ(t)− ρ0(t))‖+ ‖(Q(ρβ, β)−Q)ρβ‖
≤‖Q‖‖ρβ − ρ0‖+ βM .
By Gronwall’s inequality, for t ∈ [0, T ], we have
‖ρβ(t)− ρ0(t)‖ ≤ βMe‖Q‖T ,
which finishes the proof.
We now prove (iii). Denote E = {x1, · · · , xk}, then Support of ρ∗(x) ⊂ E implies
ρ∗(x) =
{
0 if x 6∈ E ;
≥ 0 if x ∈ E . (8)
Since x ∈ E is a NE, ui(y) ≥ ui(x) when y ∈ Ni(x), for any i = 1, · · · , d. For x ∈ E , we
substitute ρ∗(x) into the R.H.S. (7), which forms
N∑
i=1
∑
y∈Ni(x)
[ui(y)− ui(x)]+ρ∗(y)−
N∑
i=1
∑
y∈Ni(x)
[ui(x)− ui(y)]+ρ∗(x)
=
N∑
i=1
∑
y∈Ni(x)
[ui(y)− ui(x)]ρ∗(y)− 0
=0 ,
where the last equality is from the following facts in two cases. (i) If y 6∈ E , ρ∗(y) = 0
from (8). (ii) if y ∈ E , ui(y) ≥ ui(x), then ui(y) − ui(x) = 0. Similarly, we can show the
case when x 6∈ E . 
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3.4. Nash equilibria selection. FPE gives the stationary distributions (equilibrium)
for the dynamics. It allows us to rank different equilibria by comparing the probabilities.
For potential games, the stationary distribution is the Gibbs measure, which provides
the same ranking as that given by simply comparing potentials. Denote x1, · · · , xk ∈ S as
distinct NEs. A natural order is as follows:
x1 ≺ x2 · · · ≺ xk, if ρ∗(x1) < · · · < ρ∗(xk) . (9)
Here x ≺ y is to say that the strategy y is better(more stable) than strategy x. The above
definition is equivalent to look at φ(x1) < · · · < φ(xk), since ρ∗(x) = 1K e−
φ(x)
β .
For non-potential games, although there is no potentials, the stationary solution of FPE
ρ∗(t) still provides a way of ranking equilibria. We call it the transport order of NEs.
Definition 5 (Transport order of NEs). Assume ρ∗(x) = limβ→0 limt→∞ ρ(t, x) exits,
where ρ(t, x) is the solution of (7) with any initial measure ρ0 ∈ Po(S). We define the
order of NE by
x1 ≺ x2 · · · ≺ xk, if ρ∗(x1) < · · · < ρ∗(xk) . (10)
In Section 5, we will give several examples to illustrate this selection method.
4. Entropy dissipation
In this section, we illustrate the connection between our Markov process and statistical
physics, named the discrete H theory. We will mainly focus on potential games. We
borrow two “discrete” physical functionals to measure the closeness between two discrete
measures, ρ and ρ∞(x) = 1K e
−φ(x)
β . One is the discrete relative entropy (H)
H(ρ|ρ∞) :=
∑
x∈S
ρ(x) log
ρ(x)
ρ∞(x)
.
The other is the discrete relative Fisher information (I)
I(ρ|ρ∞) :=
∑
(x,y)∈E
(log
ρ(x)
ρ∞(x)
− log ρ(y)
ρ∞(y)
)2+ρ(x) .
The H theory states that the relative entropy decreases along player’s decision process.
The following theorem can be viewed as discrete H theorem for finite player games.
Theorem 6 (Discrete H theorem). Suppose ρ(t) is the transition probability of Xβ(t) in
potential games. Then the relative entropy decreases
d
dt
H(ρ(t)|ρ∞) < 0 .
And the dissipation of relative entropy is β times relative Fisher information
d
dt
H(ρ(t)|ρ∞) = −βI(ρ(t)|ρ∞) . (11)
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Proof. Since I(ρ|ρ∞) ≥ 0 and equality is achieved if and only if ρ = ρ∞, we only need to
prove (11). Substituting ρ∞(x) = 1K e
−φ(x)
β into the relative entropy, we observe
H(ρ|ρ∞) =
∑
x∈S
ρ(x) log
ρ(x)
ρ∞(x)
=
∑
x∈S
ρ(x) log ρ(x)−
∑
x∈S
ρ(x) log ρ∞(x)
=
∑
x∈S
ρ(x) log ρ(x) +
1
β
∑
x∈S
ρ(x)φ(x) + logK
∑
x∈S
ρ(x)
=
1
β
(β
∑
x∈S
ρ(x) log ρ(x) +
∑
x∈S
ρ(x)φ(x)) + logK .
From the explicit formulation of FPE (2), we have
d
dt
H(ρ(t)|ρ∞) = 1
β
d
dt
{β
∑
x∈S
ρ(t, x) log ρ(t, x) +
∑
x∈S
ρ(t, x)φ(t, x)}
=− 1
β
∑
(x,y)∈E
(φ(x) + β log ρ(t, x)− φ(y)− β log ρ(t, y))2+ρ(t, x)
=− 1
β
· β2 ·
∑
(x,y)∈E
(log
ρ(t, x)
ρ∞(x)
− log ρ(t, y)
ρ∞(y)
)2+ρ(t, x)
=− β · I(ρ(t)|ρ∞) ≤ 0 ,
which finishes the proof. 
Besides the discrete H theorem, there is a deep connection between FPE (2) and sta-
tistical physics from the mathematical viewpoint. This connection is known as entropy
dissipation, i.e. the relative entropy decreases to zero exponentially. We show similar
results for the proposed model.
Theorem 7 (Entropy dissipation). Given a potential game with β > 0, ρ0 ∈ Po(S), there
exists a constant C = C(ρ0, G) > 0 such that
H(ρ(t)|ρ∞) ≤ e−CtH(ρ0|ρ∞) . (12)
The proof of Theorem 7 is presented in [5].
5. Examples
We give several examples to illustrate the model.
Example 1: Consider a two-player Prisoner Dilemma (A,BT ) game with cost matrix
A = B =
(
1 3
0 2
)
.
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Here the strategy set is S = {(C,C), (C,D), (D,C), (D,D)}. This particular game is a
potential game, with
φ(x) = −(u1(x) + u2(x)) , where x ∈ S .
The strategy graph is G = K22K2.
C,C C,D
D,C D,D
To simplify notation, we denote the transition probability function as
ρ(t) = (ρCC(t), ρCD(t), ρDC(t), ρDD(t))
T ,
which satisfies FPE (7). By numerically solving (7) for ρ∗ = limβ→0 limt→∞ ρ(t), we find
a unique invariant measure ρ∗ for any initial condition ρ(0), which is demonstrated in
Figure 1.
(C,C) (C, D) (D, D) (D, D)0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Figure 1. The invariant measure ρ∗ for Prisoner Dilemma.
Indeed, we know that ρ∗ is a Gibbs measure and (D,D) is the unique Nash equilibrium.
Example 2: Consider an asymmetric game (A,BT ), i.e. A 6= B. This means players’ cost
depend on their own identity. Let A =
(
1 2
2 1
)
and B =
(
1 3
2 1
)
. This game is not a
potential game. Again the strategy graph is G = K22K2.
FINITE PLAYER GAME 13
C,C C,D
D,C D,D
By solving (7) for ρ∗ = limβ→0 limt→∞ ρ(t), we obtain a unique ρ∗ for any initial condition
ρ(0), which is shown in Figure 2.
(C,C) (C, D) (D, D) (D, D)0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Figure 2. The invariant measure ρ∗ for asymmetric game.
As we can see, ρ∗ only supports at (C,C) and (D,D), both of which are Nash equilibria
of the game. Moreover, ρ∗CC is larger than ρ
∗
DD, which implies that (C,C) is more “stable”
than (D,D). This is intuitive because player 2 is more willing to change his/her status
from (C,D) to (C,C) than player 1 to move the status (D,C) to (D,D), since player
2’s cost changes more rapidly than the one of player 1: u2(C,D) − u2(C,C) = 2 > 1 =
u1(D,C)− u1(D,D).
Example 3: Consider a Rock-Scissors-Paper game (A,BT ) with the strategy sets S1 =
S2 = {r, s, p} and the cost matrix
A = B =
 0 −1 11 0 −1
−1 1 0
 .
The strategy graph is G = K32K3:
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r, r
r, s r, p
s, r
s, s s, p
p, r
p, s p, p
Again, we obtain a unique invariant ρ∗ for any initial condition ρ(0) in Figure 3.
(r,r) (r,s) (r,p) (s,r) (s,s) (s,p) (p,r) (p,s) (p,p)0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
Figure 3. The invariant measure ρ∗ for Rock-Scissors-Paper.
From the figure, we find that the invariant measure ρ∗ is a uniform measure. We con-
clude that, although each player chooses his/her own strategy depending on each others,
at the final time, they will arrive at a state that players select strategies uniformly and
independently.
Example 4. We consider the same Rock-Scissors-Paper game with constraints, in order to
illustrate the effect of the structure of the strategy graph on stationary joint probability
ρ∗. Here the constraint is that player 1 is not allowed to play Scissors following Rock and
vice versa. There is no restriction on player 2. The corresponding strategy graph S1 is in
Figure 4 while the strategy graph S2 is a complete graph. We consider S12S2 for FPE
(??) and solve for the invariant measure ρ∗.
FINITE PLAYER GAME 15
r
s p
Figure 4. Player 1’s strategy graph
(r,r) (r,s) (r,p) (s,r) (s,s) (s,p) (p,r) (p,s) (p,p)
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.2
Figure 5. The invariant measure ρ∗ for Rock-Scissors-Paper with constraints
From Figure 5, we observe several properties that accord with modeling intuitions.
Firstly, player 1 is at disadvantage to player 2, since the chance of player 1 winning is less
than that of player 2,
ρ∗(r,s) + ρ
∗
(p,r) + ρ
∗
(s,p) = 0.2228 < 0.4329 = ρ
∗
(s,r) + ρ
∗
(r,p) + ρ
∗
(p,s) .
Secondly, we see that player 1 and 2’s probabilities are not independent, meaning that they
make decisions depending on each others’ choices. Thirdly, from player 1’s perspective,
by assuming player 2 selected strategies uniformly, player 1 would choose Paper more
frequently than Rock and Scissors due to the constraint. Thus in turn by taking advantage
of this information, player 2 would have selected Paper (0 cost) or Scissors (-1 cost). This
is reflected by Figure 5 that the top three states with highest probabilities are (r, p), (s, s)
and (p, p).
6. Conclusion
We summary all features of the proposed dynamic framework: First, the model incor-
porates players myopicity, uncertainty and greedy when making decisions; Second, the
model works for both potential and non-potential games. For potential games, the rank-
ing of Nash equilibria given by the limit distribution coincides with the ranking given by
the potential; For non-potential games, this ranking relates to the Morse decomposition
and Conley-Markov matrix proposed in [7]; Last but not least, the FPE converges to
Gibbs measure for potential games. The convergence is exponentially fast, whose rate is
controlled by the relation between discrete entropy and Fisher information [5, 11].
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